From:	Carol Braymer <carol_braymer@yahoo.com>
Sent:	Tuesday, May 18, 2021 3:01 PM
To:	Angie Lake; Rep. Ann Bollin (District 42)
Cc:	Dr. Tamara Mitchell
Subject:	Testimony on HB 4837, HB 4838, HB 4839 and HB 4840

From:
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HB 4838:

KALEAT supports this bill with amendments that have been submitted to Rep. Green's office. The proposed language requires the **tabulators not be connected to the internet**, as well as **electronic voting systems not be programmed for weighted voting functionality**.

Adam Reames, representative from the Secretary of State's office, implied that since there was "no evidence" that anyone hacked into Michigan's voting machines that we don't need to be concerned with elections systems being connected to the internet. This is simply not true. With increased technological capability comes increased responsibility, and since internet hacking is "big business", it is irresponsible not to be proactive on this subject.

One of the objections to this bill raised by Mr. Reames was that changes or updates may need to be made to machines on the day of the election, and would require internet connection to do so. This position is alarming. All voting equipment should be updated, thoroughly tested and ready to go **prior** to election day. Any changes made to tested and "certified" election system hardware or software (including election definition files which are currently not considered software) must be thoroughly retested prior to election day. Code of Federal Regulations are extremely strong on this with regard to FDA or FAA regulated systems. Should we not expect the same level of security for our election systems? There is no compelling need for election systems to be connected to the internet after final testing as well as on election day.

Alex Halderman, University of Michigan expert hired by the state to examine computer system issues in Antrim County, published 20 recommendations after his review. Recommendation #17 states "*Counties that transmit scanner results over the Internet or using wireless modems should discontinue these practices, as recommended by the Michigan Election Security Advisory Commission.*"

With regard to **weighted voting**, the only purpose of this functionality is to cheat. While there has been no proven use of this functionality in Michigan elections, at least some of the machines used in Michigan elections are **capable** of having this functionality installed by purchasing additional hardware and/or software. Use of this functionality would be difficult to detect since the number of people casting votes at the machines would match the number of votes cast, but the totals for the affected candidates or questions would not reflect how the people actually voted. We must be proactive and prohibit this source of potential fraud.

There must also be severe consequences if either of these issues are violated.

HB 4840

KALEAT supports this bill with amendments that have been submitted to Representative Borton's office. The proposed language for this bill specifically states all electronic poll book software and election sytem hardware and software including but not limited to election definition files, memory devices, computer system files, security files, and transactional files used at any primary or general election must be carefully preserved and may be destroyed after the expiration of 22 months following the date of the primary or election at which it was used.

Alex Halderman, after his investigation of the Antrim county incident, made the following recommendation (number 19): *"Jurisdictions should retain electronic election records, such as memory cards and EMS (Election Management System) data, for as long as physical records. These provide important evidence for investigating or (disproving)problems later discovered or alleged."* One of the reasons he came to this recommendation was that he discovered files missing or overwritten that would have provided useful in his research. He did not feel this was done will ill-intent, but nevertheless, his investigation into allegations was impeded by the lack of these files.

Mr. Reames implied the cost of retaining software would require purchase of additional computers, and would thus be prohibitive. Instead of requiring new computers, clerks could save images of the hard drives, or simply replace the hard drives and retain the original. There are solutions available that would not add prohibitive costs.

HB 4837

KALEAT supports this bill. This is a common sense measure that will keep the QVF out of the hands of private companies and foreign entities.

Mr. Reames concern about a clerk retiring within days of an election is easily addressed by having the Deputy Clerk also be accredited or certified. This would be good practice anyway. What happens now if the Clerk is sick or otherwise unavailable on election day?

HB 4839

KALEAT supports this bill. Never should an absentee ballot application be sent without first being requested by a legitimate registered voter.